



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

understood and admired even by minds of coarser fibre, wholly devoid of education." It is based upon a sort of false mysticism which seeks the infinite in vagueness, in the absence of limitation, in boundless and grandiose desires.

But is not the secret of German success precisely that sense of order which is claimed as the especial possession of the Latin races? It is necessary to be clear on this point. Ferrero answers without hesitation, No. Order is not simply organization. Order is above all "the sense of the limits which a society ought not to overpass if it does not wish to see reason transform itself into folly, truth transform itself into error, beauty transform itself into ugliness, and good transform itself into evil."

Ferrero's fundamental idea is simple enough—so simple, indeed, that it would seem scarcely to require two hundred and fifty pages of print for its explication. The treatise is indeed prolix and eloquent rather than concise and analytical. Its central idea, however, appears to be as profound as it is simple, and its implications are wide and deep. To have stated the idea clearly, to have called attention arrestingly to the extent of its possible meaning—this is no mean achievement. Ferrero seems to have outlined a great and vital truth—a truth that is perhaps very close to *the* truth. There is something wholesome and inspiring in his exhortation to the world to return to the worship of that God who is "the august guardian of measure."

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE. By William Harbutt Dawson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918.

When a crime is committed by an individual the ethical sense of mankind demands the punishment of the criminal. Revenge, it is true, is not the animus; but punishment is punishment—and it involves restraint and privation. Is there any reason why the same logic should not be applied to nations? To this question William Harbutt Dawson replies, in effect, that if it is out of the question to indict a whole nation, it is even more impracticable to punish a whole nation.

In a sense Germany is even now being punished. She is sustaining enormous losses on the battlefield—making bloody sacrifices in a cause which, if she ever learns the truth, will fill her soul with loathing. At home her people are said to be upon the verge of starvation. The judgment of history will be against her—and age-long infamy in the sight of the whole world is no light matter. Yet all this does not seem to be enough. Germany, we say in our hearts, is a criminal, and she should be punished as criminals are punished.

Thus it appears that for the majority of men the ideas of justice and retaliation are almost inextricably intermixed. And history hardly furnishes a precedent to show the world how to deal with an international crime so monstrous, so deliberately premeditated, as that which Germany has perpetrated. Such is the ethical problem. The answer certainly cannot be given by a purely pacifist philosophy; indignation, even when it is righteous, may be a poor counselor; and so perhaps we cannot do better than listen to the warnings of caution and common sense.

These are set forth by Mr. Dawson with that cool logic and that weight of conviction which always assure for this writer's views an attentive hearing. Though attached to moderation on principle, the author does not simply urge the practice of this virtue; rather he points out the formidable difficulties in the way of a punitive policy. His reasoning is hard to resist.

Proposed measures of economic retaliation range in practicability from the trade boycott of the Central Powers by the Allied nations to the internationalization of the Kiel Canal—"a measure," remarks Mr. Dawson, "at least more sensible than the alternative proposal, which is that it should be filled up." All these suggestions the author analyzes conscientiously, with the result that he finds them all defective. Stated simply, the unavoidable conclusion appears to be that commercial retaliation would mean not the punishment of Germany, but rather a continuation of the war under a new form; and it would mean that the real purpose of the Allies had failed. Moreover, the methods employed would necessarily be crude and wasteful. "As a simple weapon of commercial warfare, even a tariff of the ordinary kind is a device of questionable efficiency; far from being an arm of precision, it is at best a cumbersome blunderbuss with an ugly kick and an evil way of dispersing its shot indiscriminately. It is far worse with a trade boycott."

Proposals for political retaliation include projects of map-making of which the most extreme is the dismemberment of the German Empire. A thorough examination of even the more moderate and plausible of these plans strongly suggests that there is something vitally wrong with the conception on which they are all based. For example, to take from Prussia her Polish territories against her will would entail the expatriation of more Germans than Poles, and the last state of the Polish question would be worse than the first. Nor could anything but evil result from reversing the political situation in Austria-Hungary, by taking three millions of Germans bodily out of Austria and placing them under their old enemies, the Czechs. Changes, to be sure, are desirable. In Austria-Hungary a third kingdom comprising large Czech and Slovak populations might well be created. The southern Slav nations might advantageously be federated. But political changes should not be made rashly or in a spirit of retribution. It is really a very debatable question whether anything would ultimately be gained by excluding Germany wholly from the Near East or by depriving her of her colonies. As for the dismemberment of Germany, that, if it were possible, would be a signal for a new war for national unity. But in fact it would be a dismemberment in name only; for the states of the empire are organically united by interest and by feeling. Spiritual and economic dissection is beyond the power of political surgery.

Willy-nilly we must reckon with Germany in the future, and in some sense we must be reconciled to her. Unless the Allies should have the will and the power utterly to destroy her, she will remain a great nation, with power both passively and actively to help or harm the world. She will recover her strength. "I predict with confidence," writes Mr. Dawson, "that the rapidity of this recovery will even more startle the world than did the recovery of France after 1870." She will seek alliances, and she will find them, for alliances have always been determined in the long run by interest. Ill-judged retributive

measures, then, would mean a resumption of the old European system, with its dangerous division of nations into hostile groups and its unsafe doctrine of the balance of power.

With a command of facts, a nicety of reasoning and a patience in analysis, that enforce respect, Mr. Dawson discusses all the difficult and delicate problems of the peace that is to follow the present war. The question of indemnities, of reparation, of the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine—these and many other questions he presents in a somewhat unexpected but very clear light. Always he inclines toward astonishingly moderate views. He even advocates, though admitting the moral right of France to say the last word on the subject, a compromise with regard to Alsace-Lorraine. It is difficult in this and some other cases to keep one's point of view so entirely objective as a proper appreciation of the argument doubtless requires. One occasionally feels that plain moral principles are safer guides than somewhat doubtful inferences from confusing evidence. But on the whole, Mr. Dawson's treatise expresses a point of view that cannot be left out of consideration.

The conclusion of the whole matter would seem to be that the victory of the Allies must be in the end a moral victory. A political and moral regeneration of Germany is what we must hope the war will lead to. If the evil spirit is driven out of Germany, then indeed we may dispense with retaliation; but if not, retaliation, Mr. Dawson seems to believe, would be worse if possible than a practical restoration of the condition that existed before the war. Moral victory, however, depends upon material victory; and material victory must be complete. It must also, alas, be costly: moral evils are not removed by easy triumphs.

THE MAKING OF A MODERN ARMY, AND ITS OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD. By René Radiguet, General de Division, Army of France. Translated by Henry P. du Bellet, formerly American Consul at Rheims. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.

More limited in scope and less philosophic in thought than Lieutenant Colonel Azan's treatise upon modern warfare, General Radiguet's little book, *The Making of a Modern Army*, perfectly fulfills the modest purpose declared by its author. It will certainly aid Americans "in reading between the lines of the *communiqués*, in comprehending the plan and the importance of individual engagements, and finally in enabling those who have relatives at the front to realize fully the importance of the parts assigned to them."

The book is, moreover, an admirably clear and concise manual of war knowledge. To young men who are expecting to become officers in the American Army it should be of very great use as affording a rapid yet somewhat detailed account of the facts and methods with which they will need to become thoroughly familiar. The principal points in regard to the work of every kind of troops, the value and use of every variety of weapon, the duties of officers, including those of the chief and his staff, are all fully outlined. The making of trenches and the organization of trench systems are carefully explained. With-